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I. INTRODUCTION
Colombia has long been a misunderstood country. Representations of

Colombia and its recorded history have been limited to accounts of drugs,
violence, and human rights abuses. However, the unrecorded history of
Colombia reflects a constant struggle against such problems. Colombia is

currently fighting a war on two fronts. On one side, Colombia has been
fighting its own internal war against subversion, common crime, national
impunity, paramilitaries, narco-terrorism,' corruption, and institutionalized
violence.2 On the other side, Colombia is currently dealing with many
external pressures related to fighting a drug war that has international

implications.3 Fighting these two fronts has left Colombia in a weak and
disintegrated state.

This Article examines the Colombian peace process, including an
analysis of the historical context in which it takes place, and the process
by which the current peace process took shape. This Article also explores
factors that affect the Colombian peace process, such as the war on drugs
and the increasing involvement of the United States in that war.
Additionally, the conflict in Colombia has had devastating effects on the
human rights situation in Colombia. The growing number of human rights
violations suggest an inadequacy of legal protections afforded to those
who are involved in the conflict in Colombia. This Article also analyzes
the role of international humanitarian law in the internal conflict in
Colombia. In this respect, this Article looks at how the internationalization
of the Colombian conflict has affected the peace process.

1. CARLOS ARRIETA ET AL., NARCOTRAFICO EN COLOMBIA 132 (Tercer Mundo Editores,
1990) (discussing how the drug cartels are one of the principle actors involved in Colombia's
violence). Drug cartels use violence to pressure the Colombian government to consent to their
demands. This narco-terrorism is one of the many factors that serve to destabilize Colombia. Id.
2. Id.
3. See LIBARDO OREJtELA DfAz, NARCOTRAFICO & EXTRADicION 189 (Dario Villamizar
ed., 1997).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Violence
Violence in Colombia is deeply rooted in its history.4 For the better part
of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Colombia was awash in
violence because of party factionalism.' The fight between liberals and
conservatives struggling for power came to a head in 1948 following the
assassination of liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan by conservative forces
during an episode of mass rioting known as El Bogotazo.6 El Bogotazo was
the beginning of La Violencia in Colombia.! La Violencia was a period in
Colombian history of mass violence, rioting, and generalized war between
liberal and conservative forces.
After a brief dictatorship by General Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957), liberal
and conservative forces responded to La Violencia by forming a coalition
government called the "National Front." The National Front was an
arrangement by which both the liberal and conservative parties would
share power and alternate control of the presidency."0 This arrangement
formally lasted until 1973."
The National Front did help stop the violence between the liberals and
conservatives. However, the political exclusion caused by the alternating
governments was one reason for the emergence of rebel groups." Armed
insurgency groups emerged in the areas most affected by La Violencia. 3

4. DUVARDO PIEDRAHTA CARDONA, COLOMBIA: ENTRE GUERRA SuCIA YEXTRADICION
19 (Carlos Arturo Bello ed., 1990).
5. Laura Garces, The Dynamics of Violence, available at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/

2000/Colombia.noframes/story/essays/garces/(last visited Feb. 11, 2002). This violence was caused
by a fight for power between liberal and conservative forces, in combination with the neglect of
social issues by those in power. The social unrest and fight for power led to a civil war in 1946. See
also Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help? AnAnalysis ofthe Colombian Peace Process,

16 CON. J. INT'L L. 23, 27 (2000). After losing on the battlefield against conservative forces, the
Liberals turned to guerrilla warfare, thus starting the tendency of Colombian conflict to be solved
by violent actions. Id.
6. See Esquirol, supra note 5, at 28. Bogota is the Colombian city where the riots occurred.
Id
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 28.
12. Id
13. Id at 29.
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Colombia was once again divided by political ideology. On the right of the
spectrum were the political actors that were included in the National Front,
and, therefore, stood to gain from the coalition. 4 On the left were groups
of rebels excluded from the political process and affected by rural strife."
As a result, the ideology they espoused
was affected by Cold War rhetoric
6
Marxism.'
towards
and leaned
B. The Major Players
1. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
Today, there exist two major guerrilla groups in Colombia. The largest
of these groups is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
The FARC emerged in response to an attack by the Colombian
government in 1964 on a rural cooperative with communist ideology
calling itself the "independent republic of Marquetalia."' 7 Led by Manuel
Marulanda, the FARC today are estimated to have approximately eighteen
thousand full time combatants spread throughout Colombia's mountain
ranges. 8 The FARC once held control of about forty-two thousand square
kilometers of land given to them by the Colombian government as a
gesture of goodwill to bring the FARC to the peace table.'9 Today,
however, the demilitarized zone of the FARC has disintegrated as the
Colombian military has retaken control of this area, and pushed the FARC
further into southern Colombia.2"

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 29.
17. Center for International Policy's Colombia Project: Information About the Combatants
(FARC), available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm (last visited Feb. 1,2002)
[hereinafter Information About the Combatants]. According to the FARC, the American sponsored
attack on Marquetalia launched sixteen thousand Colombian soldiers against a small and mostly
unarmed minority. Those who survived the raid became the founders of the FARC. Id.
18. Id.
19. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 30. However, today this figure is subject to change following
the break of the peace process negotiations and the Colombian governments push into the

demilitarized zones in Southern Colombia.
20. Interview with Fernando Cirdenas, retired Major of the Colombian Police and
international lawyer (Mar. 28, 2002) (on file with author).
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The FARC are self-identified Marxists.2" Their political agenda
includes increased social equality,22 political legitimacy,23 and centralized

state control over the economy.24 The FARC oppose American
involvement in Colombia because they view American interests as counter
to their view of a new Colombia.25 Consequently, the FARC rejects the
Colombian government because of its subservience to the American
government.26
Over the last several years, the FARC has drifted away from its
political ideology. Today, the FARC finance themselves mostly through
kidnappings, 27 extortion, 2 and the drug trade. 29 The involvement of the
guerilla in the drug trade of Colombia is a lucrative business. The

21. See Center For International Policy's Colombia Project, Peace on the Table: FARC,
available athttp://www.cip online.org/colombia/pot-farc.htm (last visited Feb. 1,2002) [hereinafter
Peace on the Table] (generally stating the FARC'S proposals and agenda).
22. Id. § IA. Explaining their position as victims ofa "merciless policy," the FARC state that
We have been the victims of the large landed estate owners' and the military's
fury, because here, in this part of Colombia, the interests that prevail are those of
the powerful land barons and those of this country's darkest reactionary forces.
Therefore, we have had to suffer in flesh and spirit all the brutality of a rotten
regime which springs out of the financial monopolies linked to imperialism.
Id.
23. Id. § I(B)(1). The FARC state that part of the criteria for negotiation includes "political
legitimacy, security, and participation." Id.
24. Id. § II(D). With respect to the socioeconomic aspects of their agenda, the FARC state
that
Development and economic modernization of the country shall be paired to social
justice... The economic policy shall be primarily focused on broadening the
internal market, a self-sufficiency of food supply, permanently fostering
production and the promotion of small, middle, and large private industry, selfmanagement, micro-companies and an economy with solidarity.
Id.
25. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 30.
26. Id.
27. Information About the Combatants, supra note 17, § I(A) (stating that the FARC is
responsible for a majority of the kidnappings committed in Colombia today).
28. Id. (indicating that an example of the FARC's extortion techniques is a tax they levy on
all Colombian's whose assets are over one million U.S. dollars); see also U.S. Department of State,
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000- Latin American Overview, available at http://www.usinfo.
state.gov/regional/ar/terror/2000.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
29. Information About the Combatants, supra note 17, § I(A).
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Colombian Armed Forces estimate that half of the income of the FARC is
generated by drug money, amounting to between $200 million and $400
million per year. 30 "Taxing" those who grow the coca crop generates the
bulk of this income.3 However, the connection FARC has to the drug
trade has even greater links, including drug transportation, storage, and
protection.32
2. The National Liberation Army
Another major guerrilla group in Colombia is the National Liberation
Army (ELN). The ELN emerged as an outgrowth of the Cuban
revolution.33 Inspired by the Cuban model for rural revolution, the ELN
was comprised mostly of young students or ex-catholic priests.34 Today,
combatants." They fund
the ELN is comprised of about five thousand
36 and extortion. 31
kidnappings
through
themselves mostly
Unlike the FARC who target the Colombian army directly, the ELN
more often target local police stations and municipal governments. 38 As a
result of controlling these local municipalities, the ELN control local
political offices and local funds.39 Though smaller in number than the
FARC, the ELN wield a large amount of power in many Colombian
municipalities.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Administrator Donnie Marshall testified that
"Some FARC units in Southern Colombia are indeed involved in drug trafficking activities, such

as controlling local cocaine base markets. Some insurgent units have assisted drug trafficking
groups in transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia. In particular, some
insurgent units protect clandestine airstrips in southern Colombia." Id
33. Id. § I(B) (stating that the ELN founding group was mostly university students who had
been trained in Cuba after the Cuban revolution).
34. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 30. One of the most revered ELN leaders was Manuel Perez
(el Cura Perez), an ex-catholic priest from an upper-middle class family, who died of natural causes
in 1998. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 31; Information About the Combatants, supra note 17, § I(B).
37. Information About the Combatants, supra note 17, § I(B). The ELN frequently targets
oil pipelines, which symbolize foreign interests and investments in Colombia. Id.; see also U.S.
Department of State, supra note 28 (stating that in the year 2000, the ELN has attacked Colombia's
largest oil pipeline, Carlo Lim6n, 152 times).
38. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 31.
39. Id
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3. Paramilitary Groups
Paramilitary groups emerged in the 1980s as the drug trade began to
expand in Colombia. Paramilitary groups are small armed groups that are
mostly financed by wealthy landowners.4° These self-defense groups were
formed in response to the guerillas, who used kidnappings and extortion
of wealthy landowners or private armies for drug traffickers. 4 As a result,
these groups have a very extreme right-wing political ideology, mostly
representing the views of wealthy landowners towards the guerrillas.42
Since the beginning of the 1990s, paramilitary groups have expanded
in large numbers, and are now estimated to have over eight thousand
members.43 It is also estimated that paramilitary groups can be linked with
over eighty percent of the human rights abuses related to the Colombian
conflict.44 Paramilitary groups have been associated with massacres, forced
displacement of whole towns, and assassinations.4" Despite these statistics,
many observers of the Colombian conflict have viewed paramilitary
groups as allies of the Colombian government, especially at the local
level.46 Because of these allegations, guerrilla groups have refused in the

40. Information About the Combatants, supra note 17, § II.
41. Id. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Administrator Donnie Marshall explained the

connection between the drug trafficker and paramilitary groups by stating that
Several paramilitary groups also raise funds through extortion, or by protecting
laboratory operations in northern and central Colombia. The Carlos Castafto
organization, and possibly other paramilitary groups, appears to be directly
involved in processing cocaine. At least one of these paramilitary groups appears

to be involved in exporting cocaine from Colombia.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also Esquirol, supra note 5, at 34. Paramilitaries have also been linked with
different types of social cleansing. Armed bands have undertaken to rid Colombia of its
"undesirables," such as street urchins and prostitutes. Id.
45. Information About the Combatants, supra note 17, § II.
46. See Esquirol, supra note 5, at 34. Despite these allegations, the Colombian government
has not given paramilitary groups "political status." As a result, there will be no negotiation with

paramilitary groups, except for the terms of their disarmament.
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past to negotiate if paramilitary groups are present at the same negotiating
table.47 However, official government policy views paramilitary groups as
a "threat to be confronted." 48

III. ANALYSIS
A. The CurrentPeace Process
Soon after taking office, former Colombian President Andres Pastrana
opened the way for peace talks by granting, in a gesture of good faith,
forty-two thousand square kilometers as a demilitarized zone to the
FARC. 49 The creation of this clearance zone required that the army vacate
the municipalities ofVistahermosa, La Macarena, Uribe, Mesetas, and San
Vicente del Caguan in southern Colombia.5° However, despite this
concession by the Colombian government, the FARC never fully
cooperated with the peace process since its inception on January 7, 1999."
Throughout the negotiations, the FARC continued their practice of
kidnapping citizens and committing acts of violence.52 The FARC finally

47. Id. The guerrillas' argument is that as government allies, paramilitary group's interests
are sufficiently represented, and therefore, do not need to be present at the negotiating table. Id.
48. Information About the Combatants, supra note 17, § II (stating that the armed forces
viewed paramilitary groups as an increasing threat to the Colombian government).
49. Esquirol, supranote 5, at 38. As a result of the President granting this land to the FARC,
the armed forces were withdrawn from five municipalities. This caused a great deal of controversy
both inside and outside of Colombia. Many commentators questioned the validity of granting an
insurgency group such a vast amount of land and the amount of freedom given to the guerrilla
groups within that land. Others criticized the zone because it essentially gave guerrilla groups free
access to come in and out of neighboring countries, such as Venezuela. The American government
was against the zone because of the FARC's connections with the drug trade, and its belief that the
zone would be used for drug related activities. Id.
50. Center For International Policy's Colombia Project, Dialogues With the FARC Timeline,
available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/farc.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002) [hereinafter
International Policy Timeline].
51. The FARC's Moment Of Truth, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002. The FARC's lack of
cooperation was evidenced from the beginning when their leader, Manuel Marulanda, failed to
appear for the opening ceremony for the peace talks, leaving President Pastrana sitting alone at the
table. Id.;see alsoInformation About the Combatants, supra note 17 (stating that the FARC claims
that Marulanda's failure to appear for the peace talks is due to threats of assassination).
52. Information About the Combatants, supra note 17, § I(A); see also International Policy
Timeline, supra note 50.On February 25, 1999, three American indigenous rights activists were
kidnapped by the FARC in the Northeastern state of Arauca. Their bodies were found on March 6.
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pushed the Colombian government too far by kidnapping the Colombian
Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay from a commercial airplane
flight.5 3

As a result of the kidnapping of Senator Turbay and the failure to
implement negotiated criteria, the Colombian government finally
announced a formal suspension to the peace talks with the FARC and
ordered the armed forces to be sent back into the demilitarized zone that
had previously been granted to the FARC.54 This disintegration occurred

despite negotiating efforts by foreign diplomats from "friendly nations""
and Catholic Church representatives.56
B. The Failureof the Peace Process
Some observers of the Colombian conflict have argued that the failed
peace process can be attributed to the lack of agreement on several key
issues. The first issue is the role of the drug war in Colombia's armed
conflict." Some observers have argued, including the United States, that
winning the drug war in Colombia is an indispensable element to defeating
the guerrillas, who are primarily supported by drug money.5" In essence,
to win the drug war is to win the war against the guerrillas.

On September 24, 2000 the FARC called for an "armed strike" in the department of Putumayo
where a U.S Plan Colombia anti-drug offensive was to take place. The strike prohibited all vehicle
traffic in this area, leaving the Putumayo region with insufficient food, gas, and water. On
December 29, 2000, Colombian legislator and head of a Peace Committee, Diego Turbay, was
assassinated with his mother and five other people by the FARC. On June 28, 2001, FARC leader
Jorge Briceflo (El Mono Joyjoy) declared that "we have to grab people from the Senate, from
Congress, judges and ministers, from all the three powers, and we will see how they squeal." Id.
On June 29, 2001, the vice president of the Colombian Soccer Federation, Hermin Mejia
Campuzano, was kidnapped, making the relocation of the Copa America soccer tournament to

another country a likely possibility. Id.
53. A Slide Back to War, ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 2002.
54. Id.
55. La Terceria, SEmANA, Feb. 21, 2002, available at http://www.semana.com (last visited
Feb. 21, 2002) (stating that the "friendly nations" involved in helping to reinstate the Colombian
peace process involved Canada, Cuba, Spain, France, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Venezuela).
56. Id.
57. Rafael Nieto Loaiza, Processo de Paz: Mas Preguntas que Respuestas, SEMANA,
available at http://www.semana.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
58. Id.
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Other observers, however, have pointed out that focusing on the drug
war is a mistaken approach.59 The war on drugs is an important factor in
the Colombian peace process, but it is neither the cause nor the root of
Colombian violence.' Social inequality and poverty generates the swelling
numbers of the guerrillas.6 Those who live in absolute poverty and have
no possibility of an education or of bettering their lives are drawn to the
guerrilla ranks to try to gain a voice in a society that generally excludes
them. Only dialoguing, treating, and fighting the drug problem, leaves
unanswered the root problems of social inequality and injustice.62 In
essence, as long as there are no socio-economic transformations in
Colombian society, there will continue to be an armed conflict to
destabilize any effort to fight the drug war.63
A second point of great contention among observers is the nature of the
relationship between Colombia and the paramilitary groups.' Although
there is a fairly uniform consensus that the existence of paramilitary
groups destabilizes and de-legitimizes the Colombian government, there
is no consensus as to what role they should play in the Colombian peace
process.6" Although some commentators argue that there should be no
negotiation with the paramilitary groups,66 other commentators view
negotiation with them as a precondition for peace.67
In essence, the Colombian government is in a difficult position. In
order to maintain its legitimacy, the Colombian government cannot allow
Colombian citizens to defend themselves illegally. However, the key
question left unanswered by the peace process is how citizens should

59. Antonio Caballero, Lo Barato Sale Caro,

SEMANA,

available at http://www.semana.

com/archivo/articulosView.jsp?id=2 1471 (last visited Nov. 26, 2002).
60. Id. This view sees the Colombian drug problem as a symptom of Colombia's cancer, but
not its cause. To attack only a symptom will not get rid of the illness of social injustice. In fact, it
is forgetting the origin of the FARC and the reason they took up arms against the Colombian
government. This view is strengthened by the fact that for the last fifty years, and the past fourteen
presidents, the Colombian government has waged war against insurgent groups and has been
unsuccessful in defeating the insurgency movement. Furthermore, the FARC are not afraid of total
war because it works in their favor. War only results in pushing more people, such as those
displaced from their homes by the violence, into the arms of subversive groups. Id.
61. See Interview with Fernando Cirdenas, supra note 20.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Loaiza, supra note 57.
65. See id.
66. See id.; see also Information About the Combatants, supra note 17, § I(C).
67. See Loaiza, supra note 57.
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defend themselves when the government is unable to defend them.68 The
Colombian Ministry of Defense has stated that in the last three years the
Colombian police force has been reduced by thirty percent, and twenty
percent of all Colombian municipalities have no police force available for
the security of its citizens.69 So far, the Colombian government has been
unable to provide for the security, justice, and administration of many of
its regions.
A third point of contention is the significance of the demilitarized zone
granted to the FARC by President Pastrana.7 ° Prior to beginning
negotiations with the Colombian government, the FARC demanded the
Colombian army retreat from approximately forty-two thousand square
kilometers of land.7 This land was to serve as a safe haven from which the
peace talks would be conducted. One of the key issues with respect to the
demilitarized zone was how the Colombian government would retain
sufficient control over the land to satisfy American interests, while
quieting commentators who argued that the granting of the land would
bring the guerrillas one step closer to recognition as belligerents.72
The decision by the former president Andres Pastrana was greeted with
criticism from many sides. Both external and internal arguments against
the zones followed the decision by Pastrana. The main argument of the
U.S. government against the zone was that it was going to be freely used
by the guerrillas as a staging zone for drug trafficking.73 Many within
Colombia viewed the zone as a challenge to the sovereignty and
legitimacy
of the country, which had been so staunchly defended in the
74
past.

The demilitarized zone is an attempt to balance the prerequisites for
negotiating with the guerrillas, while retaining sufficient control of the
zone to quiet both external and internal criticisms. 7' However, the conflict
over the demilitarized zone created more tension and instability within

68. See id.

69. See id. (stating that in the past three years, the police force has been reduced from 130
thousand to 100 thousand, and close to 200 Colombian municipalities have no police force
available).

70.
71.
72.
73.

See infra Parts III.A, III.D. 1.
See Peace on the Table, supra note 21, § I(B)(1)(b).
See Esquirol, supra note 5, at 54.
Id.

74. Id.

75. See id. Pastrana withdrew Colombian troops from the land, but, intheory, retained control
of the land. This was based on the argument that voluntary withdrawal emphasized the states
control over the land. Id.
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Colombia. As a result of the wide range of criticisms, both Pastrana and
the peace process lost a great deal of political legitimacy. 6 Additionally,
the zone has helped to fuel internal war in Colombia by granting a safezone from which the guerrillas have conducted attacks and reinforced their
drug related activities."
C. Internationalizationof the Colombian Conflict
Through Increased US. Involvement
1. The War On Drugs
The official position of the United States focuses U.S. aid to Colombia
on the drug war, while not getting involved in the internal war of
Colombia."8 This aid was formalized in Plan Colombia, enacted during the
last year of the Clinton administration." Plan Colombia appropriates
approximately $1.28 billion U.S. dollars in aid for the Colombian military,
police, and air force for 2000, 2001, and 2002.80 U.S. funding also
supported a new counter-narcotics brigade whose objective is to create
secure conditions in Southern Colombia.8 '
Despite the official position of the United States, the main security
threat in this region is the FARC, who help in the cultivation of drug crops
and protection of the processing plants.82 Consequently, counter-narcotics
battalions from the United States will be used against the insurgency
groups in the area.83 The campaign will send Colombian troops who are

76. See id. at 55 (stating that Pastrana's granting of the zone to the guerrillas almost caused
his complete rejection as a leader, and came very close to a revolt by the armed forces).
77. See Esquirol, supra note 5, at 55.
78. Kenneth S. Sharpe & William Spencer, Refueling a Doomed War On Drugs: Flawed
Policy Feeds Growing Conflict, NACLA REP. ON THE AMERICAS, Nov.-Dec. 200 1, at 26.
79. See K. Larry Stors & Nina M. Serafino, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ANDEAN REGIONAL
INITIATIVE

(ARI): FY2002 ASSISTANCE

FOR COLOMBIA AND NEIGHBORS 1 (2002).

80. Kate Doyle & Adam Isacson, A new World Order? US. Military Mission Grows in Latin
America, NACLA REP. ON THE AMERICAS, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 17 (stating that the aid dedicated
to Colombia goes towards weapons, training, military advice, and communication equipment).
81. See id. at 18.
82. Id.
83. See Sharpe & Spencer, supra note 78, at 26. The FARC in the area of Southern Colombia
will continue to be a threat to U.S. drug policy in the region. Thus, "the very structure of the policy
itself will generate mounting pressure for dragging the United States more deeply into a full-scale
counterinsurgency war." Id.
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trained, armed, and supported by the United States into land that is
controlled by the FARC.84 As aresult, many commentators have expressed
their fears that the United States will become involved in "a Vietnam-style
quagmire."85
This concern with the drug war has overshadowed every other aspect
of violence in Colombia. 6 Although a long history of political violence is
readily acknowledged, the current rise of violence in Colombia is
attributed primarily to the increasing influx of drug money which is used
to support groups such as the FARC.87 Furthermore, many have argued
that the prospect of Colombia becoming a failed state is a direct threat to
U.S. security interests.8 Therefore, the United States has placed conditions
that must be met for Colombia to continue receiving monetary aid. Some
of these conditions include the enforcement of the Colombian extradition
treaty with the United States, 9 and the strengthening of the military forces
in Colombia. 9°
Many of these conditions have been aimed at fighting the drug war, and
have been counterproductive with respect to the internal war in Colombia.
For example, in the 1990s, drug traffickers directly attacked the
Colombian government through a wave of violence in response to the
implementation of the extradition treaty between Colombia and the United

84. Doyle & Isacson, supra note 80, at 18; see also Carol Clark, PlanColombia: Is the US.
Addictedto MilitaryFixes, availableathttp'//www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/colombia.noframes/
story/essays/clark (last visited Aug. 16, 2002) (quoting drug trafficking and security expert Bruce
Bagley as stating that Plan Colombia is "moving very hard on the military side and very weakly
on the development side, leaving the peasantry with no real alternatives.").
85. Clark. supra note 84.
86. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 84.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 85. The U.S. response to President Pastrana granting the FARC a demilitarized zone
demonstrates this point. The United States was clearly against the demilitarized zones because of
the fear that it would increase the level of drug cultivation. The U.S. position was more concerned
with a drug interdiction program rather than the prospect of facilitating a negotiated peace. Id.
89. See Joshua Warmund, Removing DrugLords andStreet Pushers:The ExtraditionTreaty
ofNationals in Colombia andthe DominicanRepublic,22 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.2373,2419 (1999).
In 1997, Colombian extradition law was changed to allow the extradition of Colombian nationals
to the United States. President Ernesto Samper pushed through this law under immense pressure
from the United States. Id.; see alsoE-Mail from Michael C. Kenney, Ph.D. Candidate, University
of Florida, Department of Political Science, to author (Oct. 26, 2001, 10:03 EST) (on file with
author). Much of the pressure placed on Colombia for the change in its extradition law arose at a
time when the Samper presidency was under immense pressure from the United States for its
supposed links to the Cali Cartel. Id.
90. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 88. A central part of the American aid to Colombia is focused
on strengthening the Colombian military to make the drug policy more effective. Id.
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States.91 This left Colombia in a weak and disintegrated position. By
helping destabilize the country, the response to the extradition treaty has
helped strengthen the connection between drug traffickers and the
guerrillas.92 Therefore, the focus on implementing U.S. policy goals helped
to increase, rather than decrease, the violence associated with narcoterrorism.93 It also helped make the drug war more difficult to combat. In
essence, many of the conditions set by the United States challenge the
sovereignty of Colombia and its internal struggle by placing drug policy
goals over the search for peace in Colombia.
2. The Colombian Guerrillas as International Terrorists
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,9' the United
States has increased its focus and emphasis on Colombia.9 5 As the United
States turns its focus to fighting the "War on Terror," it has turned its
attention to fighting the insurgency movements in Colombia. In fact, three
Colombian groups are deemed terrorist groups by the U.S. State

Department.' The FARC is also identified by the State Department as "the
most dangerous international terrorist group based in this hemisphere."97

91. Sandy R. Murphy, DrugDiplomacyandtheSupply Side Strategy: A Survey ofthe United

States Practice,43 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1305 (1990) (discussing the effects of a supply-side focus
on the drug war in Colombia).
92. Id.
93. ARRIETA ET AL., supra note 1, at 25.

94. On September 11, 2001 the United States was attacked by the al-Qaeda terrorist group,
starting the "War on Terror."
95. Doyle & Isacson, supra note 80,at 19.
96. Id. Explaining the U.S. decision to treat Colombian guerrilla groups as terrorist groups,
Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that
Quite a few [terrorist groups] will go after our interests in the regions that they are
located in and righi here at home. And so we have to treat all of them as
potentially having the capacity to affect us in a global way... For example, we
have designated three groups inColombia alone as being terrorist organizations,
and we are working with the Colombian government to protect their democracy
against the threat provided or presented by these terrorist organizations.
Id.
97. International Policy Timeline, supra note 50, Oct. 15. While calling the FARC "the most
dangerous international terrorist group in this hemisphere," the U.S. Department of State also said
that in order to fight terrorism, the United States will use "all the elements of our national power

as well as the elements of the national power of all the countries in our region." Id
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In this respect, Anne Patterson, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, has
compared the FARC to the al-Qaeda terrorist group of Osama bin Laden.98
It remains a point of contention whether the guerrilla groups in
Colombia are indeed international terrorists. The United States points to
the continued kidnapping of U.S. and foreign citizens, as well as the
extortion of U.S. businesses in Colombia." The United States also cites the
efforts of FARC and ELN to reach out to other international terrorists,
such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA),"°° as well as the continuing
practice of targeting security forces within Colombia. °
Other commentators, however, argue that the situation in Colombia is
a purely internal conflict. 2 They argue that it is not even a civil war
because the Colombian conflict is within a polarized society that involves
just a few actors of society. 3 It is these actors resorting to violence in
order to resolve their differences that constitutes the violence in Colombia
today.' Furthermore, in the wake of September 11, there is a growing

98. Id. Oct. 24-25. Patterson has also stated that "[mly government is concerned by the use
of the [FARC] demilitarized zone as a base for terrorist acts." Id. She also affirmed the U.S. view
that Plan Colombia as the best way to combat terrorism in Colombia. Id.; see also U.S. Department
of State Counter-Terrorism Office, available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ (last visited July 18,
2002) (stating that the U.S. official counter-terrorism policy makes no concessions to terrorist
groups, brings terrorists to justice, and increases the counter-terrorism capabilities of the United
States to allies which require U.S. aid).
99. See U.S. Department of State, supra note 28, Colombia. An example of the extortion of
American firms is the continued attacks by the FARC on the American firm Drumond's coal
interests. These attacks by the FARC were the result of Drummond's refusal to pay millions of
dollars in tax to the FARC. This tax is "imposed" by the FARC on all people or businesses that are
valued at over one million dollars. Id.; see also International Policy Timeline, supra note 50, July
15-16. The FARC has also been responsible for numerous kidnappings that have caught the
attention of the international community. One such kidnapping was the kidnapping of Meta's
former governor Alan Jarawhile traveling in a U.N. vehicle on July 15, 2001. Id.
100. International Policy Timeline, supra note 50, Aug. 13 (stating that Colombian officials
arrested members of the IRA in Colombia after having supposedly spent several weeks training
FARC members in the use of terrorist tactics).
101. See id. June 28.
102. Loaiza, supra note 57.
103. Id. The view of Colombia not having a civil conflict may seem misguided to some,
considering the extent of the violence that exists in Colombia, and the impact on the lives of
Colombian citizens.
104. See id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

15

FLORIDA
JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL
Florida Journal
of International
Law, Vol. 15,LAW
Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 5

[Vol. 15

need to distinguish one armed group from another.' °5 In the war against
terrorism, the term terrorist has been reduced to mean any armed group
that attacks civilians."°
D. Human Rights Violations
Political violence has resulted in massive human rights abuses in
Colombia. The internal conflict in Colombia causes the civilian population
to suffer the most. 0 7 Every day in Colombia, ten civilians are killed as a
result of violence between different armed groups.0 8 The FARC, ELN,
and paramilitary groups are all frequent violators of the international
human rights law (IHL).'" The Colombian army is also implicated in the
violation ofhuman rights because oftheir "consistent and pervasive failure
or unwillingness to distinguish civilians from combatants in accordance
with the laws of war."" 0 In addition, the violence in Colombia has forced
entire towns and populations to become displaced from their homes."1 In
1998, there were over one million displaced people in Colombia."'
Displaced Colombians live in absolute poverty, separated from their
homes and family by the violence that has engulfed Colombia.

Furthermore, the breakdown of the peace process has increased the risk
of human rights violations. Colombian civilians in the demilitarized zone
now face being termed "pro-guerrilla" by paramilitary groups merely for

the fact that they remained in their homes while the guerrillas where in

105. See Jim Tull, Negociar Ante Todo, SEMANA, available at http://www.semana.com/
archivo/articulosView.jsp?id=20713 (last visited Nov. 26, 2002).
106. Id.
107. WOLA Colombia Program, available at http://www.wola.org/colombiaprg.html (last
visited Feb. 11, 2002) [hereinafter WOLA].
108. Id.
109. See Arturo Carillo-Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in International
HumanitarianLaw asAppliedto InternalArmedConflict,15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1,24-28 (1999).
110. Id. at27.
111. WOLA, supra note 107.
112. Carillo-Suarez, supra note 109, at 27 (stating that the principle cause for the forced
displacement of Colombian citizens is the violation of human rights).
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charge of the zone." 3 Consequently, in a system of blind retaliation,
civilians run the risk of being attacked by paramilitaries for being guerrilla
sympathizers.' 4
Colombian civilians therefore had to adopt the rules imposed upon
them by private armies that control the particular region they live in." 5
This has brought on the privatization of security and collective terror." 6
Therefore, confidence and security have been replaced by the law of
silence, the law of poverty, and a general lack of confidence among
Colombian civilians." 7 It is in the midst of such conditions that a
resurgence of desperate and easy solutions to establish order by the use of
private groups, such as paramilitary groups, arises. This vicious cycle of
violence continues in Colombia.
E. The Role ofInternationalLaw in the Colombian Conflict
The principal source of international law applicable to Colombia is
Protocol II to the Geneva Convention of 1949."' Article 3 to the Geneva
Convention is the central part of humanitarian law applicable to noninternational armed conflicts, and Protocol II is an expansion of common

113. Human Rights Watch, Colombia: Rupture in Peace Negotiations EndangersCivilians,
available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/01/zona0l10.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002). Jose
Miguel Vivanco, executive director of the U.S. Division of Human Rights Watch stated that "the
civilians who live in the zone were never consulted before they were included in this area and they
certainly weren't consulted about the decision to end talks." Id.
114. Id.
115. ALFREDO RANGEL SUAREZ, COLOMBIA: GUERRA EN EL FIN DE SIGLO 109 (Tercer Mundo

eds., 1999).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 110.
118. See Carillo-Suarez, supra note 109, at 36. The Colombian Constitution states that "the

rules of international humanitarian law shall in all cases be respected." Thus, IHL is binding in
Colombia. Id.
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Article 3 of the Geneva Convention" 9 Article 3 sets up a minimum
standard of humane treatment applicable to non-international internal
conflicts.
Many commentators criticize the applicability of Protocol H1.12 ° The
Colombian government did not adopt Protocol II until 1994 because it
believed that Protocol II would undermine the legitimacy of the
Colombian state, and upgrade the status of the guerrillas.' 2 ' It was further
argued that the conditions necessary for the application of Protocol IIto
an internal armed conflict were not present. 22 Instead of being an armed

119. Text of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con. of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1443
[hereinafter Protocol II]. Protocol II states that
This protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva
conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of
application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article I
of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions... This Protocol shall not
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts.
Id.; see also General Introduction to the Commentary on Protocol II, available at http://www.icrc.
(stating
org/IHL.nsf (last visited Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter General Commentary on Protocol II]
that Protocol II of 1977 is an extension of the guidelines set forth in Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention in 1949); Esquirol, supra note 5, at 40-41 nn.70-73 (stating that Colombia finally
adopted Protocol II in 1994 as part of President Samper's peace policy).
120. See generally Esquirol, supra note 5, at 40. Some see belligerency status as an obsolete
concept today. However, this was the main argument that served as the backdrop to arguments in
favor and against the adoption of Protocol II in Colombia. Some of the criticisms advanced against
the adoption ofProtocol II included arguments that the Colombian conflict did not rise to that level,
and that its adoption would undermine the Colombian government's international standing. Id
121. Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge ofApplying International Humanitarian Law
to Internal Armed Conflicts 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 916, 917 (1994) (stating that "by its very nature,
international humanitarian law conflicts with state sovereignty by placing the rights of individuals
over the rights of states"). Lopez points out that the modem trend towards civil, rather than
international, conflicts makes the Geneva Convention increasingly irrelevant. Id.
122. See General Commentary on Protocol II, supranote 119, at 4339-41. A non-international
armed conflict is one in which there is one state in conflict with certain groups within its borders.
In addition, for there to be an armed conflict, there must be open hostilities between the state and
the factions. Internal disturbances or occasional acts of violence are not sufficient for the finding
of"armed conflict." Id.
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conflict, Colombia argued that what existed in Colombia was internal
disturbances with occasional acts of violence.' 23 Therefore, it was argued
that Protocol II did not apply to Colombia. 24
Recently, however, the Colombian government radically changed its
position against Protocol II and international involvement to that of an
unqualified adherence to Protocol II. This is partly due to the revival of
international law arguments as part of the peace agenda.'26 However, in
Colombia there is a clear distinction between acceptance and observance
of international humanitarian law. 2 ' Although many in Colombia are
calling' for increased humanitarian involvement, observance of
international law remains at very low levels.12
1. Status of the Guerrillas Under Protocol II
Perhaps one of the main reasons for reluctance in Colombia to adopt
Protocol II was that its adoption may bring the Colombian government one
step closer to recognizing a belligerency status of the guerillas.129 Many of
these fears are unfounded. The international community has not
recognized the Colombian guerrillas as belligerents. 3 ' This is mostly due
to the guerrillas poor human rights record and their connection to drug
trafficking and kidnapping.'
As a result of their extensive control over large tracts of land and many
32
towns, the Colombian guerrillas are claiming the title of belligerents.'
Under international law, belligerency status indicates that an internal
armed conflict has reached the status of an international armed conflict.3

123. Protocol II, supra note 119, at 1443.
124. See Esquirol, supra note 5, at 42.
125. See Carillo-Suarez, supra note 109, at 125.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 122.
128. See id.
129. See Esquirol, supra note 5, at 43.
130. SUAREZ, supra note 115, at 98 (stating that the granting of belligerency status is a tabu
topic concerning Colombia's internal war because it would grant the guerrillas an unacceptable
advantage, and de-legitimize Colombian institutions).

131. Seeid. at99.
132. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 25.

133. Id. at 45. The recognition of an insurgency group as belligerent creates certain rights
under international law for all the parties involved. The government is generally able to practice
a full-scale war against the insurgents and it "eschews responsibility for the acts of insurgents to
third-party states and their citizens." Id. The belligerents, on the other hand, gain access and

protection from the laws of war. Id.
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As a result of such a status, the guerrilla groups would stand on equal
ground with the Colombian government, and would have formal
international standing.'34
Under this notion of belligerency, the Pastrana government had to
portray itself as retaining complete control of all of its territory. 35 Some
observers have argued that the government's inability to do so has helped
prolong, rather than shorten, the Colombian conflict. 36 The strict notion
of belligerency under which the Pastrana government acted restricted the
possibilities for negotiation with the guerrillas, and the limited viable
alternatives in helping to end the conflict. 37
The granting of status as a negotiating tool is not a new concept to the
Colombian conflict. As a prerequisite for the peace talks, the Colombian
government had to recognize the guerrillas as "political actors."' 3" Despite
their connection with drug trafficking and delinquency, the Colombian
guerrillas do have political objectives.' 39 In fact, in regions of Colombia
where the power of the state does not reach, the Colombian guerrillas
serve the function of a government through their control of justice,
communications, and "security."' 40 Therefore, with a view towards a
peaceful Colombia in the future, granting the status of belligerency to the
guerrillas may be used as an inducement to force them to stop their
systematic violations of IHL, and abandon their connection to drug
trafficking. 4 ' Therefore, with the need to adopt new and creative ways to
fight the war in Colombia, granting of belligerency status remains a viable
option for the future.'

134. See id. at 40 (stating that the formal title of belligerency is a first step towards being
declared the official government of a country in civil war). However, the status of belligerency has
been challenged by many commentators who have pointed out that insurgents have no recognized
rights. Therefore, the recognition of belligerency by third-party states is only motivated by national
self-interests. Id. at 47.
135. Id.at 53.
136. See id.
137. See Esquirol, supra note 5, at 53.
138. Id. at 58.
139. SUAREZ, supra note 115, at 99 (stating that to deny the guerrillas' political objectives
would be to close the door on all possibilities for negotiation).
140. See id.
141. See id.
at 100 (arguing that granting belligerency status to the guerrillas would accentuate
the political aspects of their struggle, while reducing the delinquent aspects).
142. See id. at 102.
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2. Rules of Conduct under International Humanitarian Law
A second issue that must be addressed with respect to the Colombian
conflict is the rules of conduct in a non-international armed conflict, and
their applicability to the Colombian conflict. The Colombian crisis and the
impact it has had on the individual lives of its citizens seems to confirm
the view that IHL is inapplicable and unenforceable in such conflicts.'43
Colombia is a country in which there are massive amounts of human rights
violations, by all parties involved, with very few actors being held
accountable for their crimes. "' The level of impunity with which all of the
players in the Colombian dilemma act only exacerbates the dilemma.
Under the rule of law set forth by the International Court of Justice in
Nicaraguav. United States,'45 a state may be held accountable for the
actions of state agents acting within the scope of their official capacity.' 46
Similarly, an individual may be held accountable if acting on behalf of the
state. 47 This is a generally accepted norm under international law.
Therefore, as a result of the connection between some factors of the armed
forces and paramilitary groups, the Colombian state may be held
responsible, under both Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and
Protocol
148
II, for the actions by paramilitary groups in violation of IHL.
Paramilitary forces often receive protection and aid from state
authorities, including protection from prosecution, and in many instances,
complete freedom of movement in heavily militarized areas. 49 Not only
has the Colombian state been implicated in directly aiding and training
paramilitary groups, but they have also been linked to indirectly aiding
these groups through acquiescence and compliance. 50 Thus, the
Colombian state has become responsible for its failure to act against
paramilitary groups and their crimes against Colombian citizens. 5 '

143. Carillo-Suarez, supra note 109, at 122 (stating that Colombia seems to point to the view
that "the increase in the intensity of the conflict has not led to a greater commitment by the parties
to respecting international humanitarian law; if anything, the frank disrespect shown by all the
actors towards humanitarian norms is ostensible").
144. See id.
145. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
146. See Carillo-Suarez, supra note 109, at 102.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 103.
149. See id.at 105.
150. See id. at 104.
151. See Carillo-Suarez, supra note 109, at 108. On July 15, 1997, the paramilitary group
Autodefensas Campesinas de Cordoba y Uraba(AUC) moved into the town of Mapiripan and killed
fourteen people who were "suspected" of being guerrilla sympathizers. Local military and police
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Additionally, both Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and Protocol II
encompass organized armed groups.'52 The term "combatants" refers to
any organized group that takes an active role in the hostilities. 5 3 Both the
Colombian guerrilla groups and paramilitary forces clearly meet the
requirements of armed forces, thus making IHL directly applicable to them
as well.
It seems clear that IHL should apply to the Colombian players.
However, the key question that remains unanswered is how it should be
enforced. Currently, there is no procedure for sanctioning or monitoring
the persistent violations of IHL in Colombia. 54 Additionally, states are
under no obligation to prosecute those who violate IHL.'" Despite the
applicability of IHL to the Colombian conflict, methods for enforcement,
such as the International Criminal Court, are still far away from being
applied.' 56
On the national level, IHL has indeed become more readily accepted
within Colombia.' However, it has so far not been fully observed by any
of the players within the conflict. Widespread massacres, kidnappings,
tortures, and disappearances continue to plague Colombia, with few people
actually brought to justice."'5 However, acceptance of IHL is an important
first step leading towards the eventual observance of IHL. Compliance
with international law may only be made possible through third-party
involvement, such as the United Nations.'59
3. U.N. Involvement in Colombia
Increased U.N. involvement may be a way to enforce the guarantees
that have not been met by the parties involved. As a result, third-party

authorities ignored calls for help from the citizens of Mapiripan. Commentators have stated that
"many organizations and even state officials have found significant evidence that the State could
have but did not stop the massacre." Id.
152. Id.at 109 (stating that "Common Article 3 states that its provisions shall be respected 'by
each party to the conflict,' while Protocol II expressly contemplates and encompasses the conduct
of 'organized armed groups,' in opposition to the security forces of the State.").
153. Id. at I10.
154. Id. at 123. Protocol II did not set up any enforcement measures. This has often been
criticized by many as one of the major reasons IHL has not been readily applied in internal

conflicts. Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Lopez, supra note 121, at 918.
See id.
See id.
Carillo-Suarez, supra note 109, at 122.
See La Terceria, supra note 55.
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involvement is a way for enforcing guarantees that neither side believes
the other will implement."W In a study of over forty internal conflicts from
around the world, international security and conflict termination expert,
Barbara Walter, contends that the presence of a third- party capable of
guaranteeing the terms of the negotiations between the government and
rebel groups is necessary for a successful peace process.'" Negotiations
fail because adversaries in the civil wars cannot make a credible promise
to submit themselves to conditions that will place them in danger. 6 ' This
is especially relevant in Colombia, where there remains a high level of fear
and mistrust by all the parties involved in the conflict.
Multilateral action enforced by a legal process, such as a resolution
voting by the U.N. Security Council, acquires a level of legitimacy that a
single unilateral action would not have. However, in order to act, the U.N.
Security Council must determine, under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter,
when there is an international breach of peace or act of aggression.'63 If it
is determined that there is an international breach of peace, the United
Nations may then take coercive diplomatic measures under Article 41, or
military action under Article 42.' However, to reach the status of an
international breech of the peace, certain criteria must be met. Some of
these criteria include conditions such as the existence of refugees in
neighboring countries, fighting that crosses boarders, a collapsed state
government, genocide, or a situation where the lives of citizens are
endangered by a lack of governmental authority.' 65 The question remains
whether the conflict in Colombia has reached the point of an international
civil conflict under these criteria, thus invoking international intervention.
Although human rights abuses are common to the Colombian conflict,
they have not reached the level of widespread genocide or ethnic conflict
found in countries such as Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia. Nor is the
Colombian conflict one which crosses state borders.' Although the
Colombian conflict is one that has serious human rights implications, it is
not an international breach of the peace to warrant military or forcible

160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Captain Davis Brown, The Role ofRegional Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41
A.F. L. REv. 225, 273 (1997).

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Interview with Fernando Cfrdenas, supra note 20 (explaining that the Colombian
conflict is purely internal and does not affect its neighbors).
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intervention under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. 167 As many observers

have argued, it remains a purely internal conflict.
Furthermore, military action through the United Nations is not a
practical solution. 68 Colombia is a large country, composed mostly of
mountains and jungles. Guerrilla groups like the FARC are not found in
only one location. Rather, they easily move and hide within the landscape
of Colombia.' 69 As the history of Colombia proves, gaining military
control is a difficult and unsuccessful proposition.' 70 To gain military
control would require a monumental and costly effort in terms of money
and human lives.' 7' The root problem of the Colombian conflict is the
social inequality that plagues its society. 172 As long as large sectors of
Colombian society do not have access to education, or 1political
and
3
economic systems, the fighting will continue in Colombia.
International involvement should instead be geared at maintaining
peace through diplomacy, and not through military force. 74 A permanent
international presence in negotiations is a way for the Colombian peace
process to gain both legitimacy and a means of enforcement which it has
lacked so far.77 This will help establish a set of rules for a peace process
that has failed in part because of a lack of rules. 76
Furthermore, international involvement should be aimed towards
discussing, observing, and making recommendations concerning
Colombian human rights violations. 77 Respect for human rights is an
essential element for achieving a lasting peace in Colombia. 7 s However,
as stated in Nicaraguav. UnitedStates, the "use of force could not be the

167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.

170. See id.; see also Caballero, supra note 59.
171. See Interview with Fernando Cardenas, supra note 20.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. Interview by SEMANA with Juan Gabriel Uribe, Chief Negotiator for the Colombian
government (Feb. 11,2002), available at www.semana.com/archivo/articulosView.jsp?id=21180
(last visited Nov. 26, 2002).
176. See id.
177. See Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J.INT'L L. 323,
325-38, 362-71 (1996) (explaining soft intervention and its applicability to human rights
violations).
178. See id. at 330.
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appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect" for human rights."'
Violence followed by more violence is not the answer to the problems in
Colombia. Is°
IV. CONCLUSION

Colombia is currently going through a phase of intensified fighting on
every side of the political spectrum. The intensification has been caused
by a simultaneous increase in the numbers of guerrilla and paramilitary
forces, combined with a partial collapse of the Colombian state for its
inability to provide security for its citizens and administer justice.
However, it is important to note that the root of the Colombian problem
lies inherently in the social injustices that exist within the country. Policy
goals aimed at fighting the guerrilla and paramilitary war should be
formed in accordance with this consideration.
The question that must be asked concerning the Colombian peace
process is not "what is the solution," but rather, "what is the correct
process."'' There are no easy solutions to the Colombian dilemma. Right
now, Colombia is faced with the prospect of a costly war, both monetarily
and in terms of the loss of human lives. However, a military solution does
not necessarily mean an end to all confrontations, and a victory in the war
does not equal peace. Rather, it exacerbates the cycle of injustice followed
by more violence. It is only through continued negotiations that there is a
possibility for a peaceful future. Unless there is a peaceful solution,
violence will continue to be the only language that is spoken, as it has been
spoken for the last century in Colombia.
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